Moral judgement draws on several recurring intuitive domains rather than a single principle, and groups differ in which domains they weight.
The theory proposes foundations including care, fairness, loyalty, authority and sanctity, with the claim that political differences reflect differing weights rather than differing reasoning ability. The descriptive finding that groups moralise different domains is well supported; the modular and innate account of why is where the argument sits.
In practice
- Two people who agree on the facts of a case disagree because one is weighing harm and the other loyalty.
- A campaign argued entirely in terms of fairness fails to move an audience that was listening for something else.
- Possible explanations
- The explanation is that moral judgement runs on several intuitive systems shaped by recurring social problems, and that political groups differ in how heavily they weight each one.
- In its favour
- It predicts a measurable pattern in how groups justify their positions, and it gave research a way to describe moral disagreement without treating one side as simply mistaken.
- Against it
- The number of foundations, their measurement and their claimed innateness are all disputed, factor analyses do not reliably recover the proposed structure, and critics argue the instrument reflects American political divisions rather than universal domains.
- Standing
- Heavily researched and disputed in its details: the number of foundations, their measurement, and their claimed innateness are all contested, and factor analyses do not consistently recover the proposed structure.
- Further reading
- Wikipedia
- Subject
- Sociology & Culture
- Essay
- How societies hold together, sort people, and change