Empiriceme · Evidence · Empirical Regularity

Ultimatum Game

Offered a split by another party, people reject unfair offers even at cost to themselves, so fairness norms constrain bargaining.

Güth's 1982 design. Offers below about 20% are routinely rejected, which is money refused to punish unfairness — the most replicated evidence that people are not narrowly self-interested.

In practice

  • A contractor offered 5% of a joint windfall walks away from the money rather than accept the split.
  • A team told their bonus pool is a tenth of the department's next door declines the pool, and the money goes back unclaimed.
Possible explanations
Explanations include fairness norms, in which an unfair offer is worth paying to punish; anger as a proximate mechanism; and reputation, since in repeated life refusing signals that one cannot be exploited.
In its favour
It is among the most replicated results in experimental economics, holding across many countries and stake sizes, and it is the clearest evidence that people are not narrowly self-interested.
Against it
Offers and rejections vary considerably across cultures, and behaviour in a laboratory with a stranger and one round may not transfer to the repeated bargaining people mostly do.
Standing
The most replicated evidence that people are not narrowly self-interested.
Further reading
Wikipedia
Subject
Games & Strategic Interaction
Essay
What is provable, and what people actually do

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